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Abstract
In this paper I review the problematic relationship between science and philosophy; in par-
ticular, I will address the question of whether science needs philosophy, and I will offer 
some positive perspectives that should be helpful in developing a synergetic relationship 
between the two. I will review three lines of reasoning often employed in arguing that phi-
losophy is useless for science: (a) philosophy’s death diagnosis (‘philosophy is dead’); (b) 
the historic-agnostic argument/challenge “show me examples where philosophy has been 
useful for science, for I don’t know of any”; (c) the division of property argument (or: 
philosophy and science have different subject matters, therefore philosophy is useless for 
science). These arguments will be countered with three contentions to the effect that the 
natural sciences need philosophy. I will: (a) point to the fallacy of anti-philosophicalism 
(or: ‘in order to deny the need for philosophy, one must do philosophy’) and examine the 
role of paradigms and presuppositions (or: why science can’t live without philosophy); (b) 
point out why the historical argument fails (in an example from quantum mechanics, alive 
and kicking); (c) briefly sketch some domains of intersection of science and philosophy 
and how the two can have mutual synergy. I will conclude with some implications of this 
synergetic relationship between science and philosophy for the liberal arts and sciences.
Keywords Philosophy of science · Science and philosophy · Heuristics · Liberal arts and 
sciences
1 Introduction
In this paper I will argue that: (i) The natural sciences need philosophy; and (ii) That sci-
entists need philosophy. I will also address some possible consequences of these theses 
for the Liberal Arts and Sciences. In doing so, I will have to define the sense in which I 
mean that science ‘needs’ philosophy and make a distinction between different ways in 
which different aspects or branches of science need philosophy. Most of my examples will 
be from physics. This being part of my professional bias, I claim that the arguments that 
apply to physics apply to biology, earth science, and other natural sciences as well. As I 
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will argue, the most important distinction to be made is not between one natural science 
and another, but between fundamental and applied science. Once this distinction is made, 
the harm of treating all of the sciences en bloc, on the model of physics, can be minimized.
Why should I be defending the use of philosophy? After all, the thesis that philosophy 
is useful for science is not likely to be agreed upon by all practicing scientists. Science, 
not philosophy, is widely regarded as the more secure source of knowledge. For it has a 
method for declaring theories wrong: in other words, for falsifying its results. This method 
is called Experiment. And science has given us machines, abundant energy, technology, 
and a healthy attitude of scepticism. The scientific worldview has freed us from prejudice, 
ignorance, and the ironclad rule of authority. Natural scientists, not philosophers, have 
earned the trust of the public opinion in matters of truth, learning, and understanding. 
Experimental results, and not the scholastic distinctions of the philosophers, are the final 
judges in the court of Science. This, at least, would seem to be a widely held view, and 
partly for good reasons. So why care about philosophy after all?
The relation between science and philosophy is an intricate and somewhat problematic sub-
ject,1 as I will review in the next Section. On the one hand, some great scientists have been 
great philosophers—not necessarily in the professional sense, but in the sense of deep think-
ing: science and philosophy often went together in the work of great figures such as Newton 
and Leibniz, so that it is sometimes hard—and perhaps unnecessary, and certainly anachro-
nistic—to say where science ends and where philosophy begins. But on the other hand, phi-
losophy is often regarded as useless, so that a philosophical outlook is irrelevant for science at 
best, and harmful at worst—as evinced by long pages of armchair philosophy that is blissfully 
uninformed by science. Or so the story goes. Hence my topic of the ‘love–hate relationship’.
Here I will concentrate on basic aspects of the relation between the two, and reduce the 
applications to education to a few final considerations. Reaching clarity about the fact that phi-
losophy is useful for science is by itself an important and urgent task. Understanding this rela-
tionship is a first key step toward developing a synergetic relationship between the two fields.
2  Science Doesn’t Need Philosophy
Let us start with the objections to the first thesis above, that the sciences need philosophy. 
There are various good reasons why scientists can claim—and have claimed—that science 
does not need philosophy or that, more or less equivalently, philosophy is useless for sci-
ence. I will consider three lines of reasoning here: the argument from the decline or death 
of philosophy, the historical or empirical argument, and the argument based on the conten-
tion that science and philosophy have different objects and methods.
a) The death of philosophy
Stephen Hawking has declared the official ‘death’ of philosophy, seemingly echoing 
Nietzsche’s famous ‘God is dead’. Commenting on questions such as the behaviour of the 
universe and the nature of reality, Hawking writes: “Traditionally these are questions for 
philosophy, but philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments 
in science, particularly physics. Scientists have become the bearers of the torch of discov-
ery in our quest for knowledge.” (Hawking and Mlodinov 2010, p. 5). In this argument, 
1 For a different perspective on this topic, see Kitchener (1988).
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knowledge must be grounded on natural science. Questions such as, “what is the nature 
of physical reality”, “what things are out there in the world?” are questions that used to be 
within the domain of philosophy, but are now part of science. Something in philosophy 
must therefore be missing, without which philosophy is left a ‘dead’ discipline. And when 
a discipline is dead, one might just as well ignore it.2 Since philosophers haven’t kept up 
with modern science, they have cut themselves off from our most secure source of knowl-
edge and discovery. Hence the question: can we dismiss Hawking’s provocative suggestion 
that philosophers have largely been neglecting the natural sciences, thereby manoeuvring 
themselves towards a margin of irrelevance, if in our world the natural sciences are becom-
ing increasingly dominant?
b) The historic-agnostic or empirical argument
The historic-agnostic argument is more cautious, and can be summarized as an agnostic 
stance about the usefulness of philosophy for science. It amounts to something like this: “I 
have never seen any examples of the usefulness of philosophy for science or, when I have 
seen usefulness in anything that philosophers were saying about science, it was because 
they were doing science not philosophy”. The argument can be appended with an enumera-
tion of instances where the limited scope of a philosophical framework hampered progress 
in science and perhaps also a theoretical account of why that was the case.
Examples to this effect would seem to abound. Think of Plato’s requirement, expressed 
in the Timaeus, that the movements of the planets should be taken to be based on uniform 
circular motions. This mathematical postulate was grounded on the philosophical and theo-
logical doctrine that the most perfect motion was circular, because the motion of the mind 
when it reflects upon itself is circular (Plato (T) 34a, 36c, 40a). It became apparent very 
early on that this axiom was untenable for concentric spheres. Hipparchus and Ptolemy had 
to add a contrived system of eccentrics and epicycles to save the phenomena. Neverthe-
less, they still formally adhered to the Platonic postulate, which has been seen by many as 
a hampering factor in the progress of cosmology (Dijksterhuis 1950, Part I, II D 15 and III 
C 68).
Another example could be Descartes’ requirement that all of physics should be based on 
the mechanical interactions between corpuscula with no other properties than form, size, 
and quantity. The dictum that physical interactions ought to take place by local contact 
collided with Newton’s theory of gravity, which entailed action at a distance. The dictum 
led Descartes to formulate his clever and imaginative, but arbitrary and unexplanatory 
theory of gravity on the basis of vortices, and a theory of magnetism based on the sup-
posed screw-shapes of particles. Making the observed macroscopic phenomena supervene 
on microscopic details that were unobservable, and could therefore be amended at zero 
risk, allowed him to give qualitative and imaginative explanations of those phenomena: 
but he fell short of finding quantitative descriptions—let alone predictions. It took Newton 
to show, in Book II of the Principia, that Descartes’ vortex theory was not only physically 
inconsistent—additional external forces would be required to keep the vortices moving—
but also inconsistent with Kepler’s laws. Richard Westfall gave the following fulminating 
evaluation of Descartes’s philosophy in connection to mechanics: “Most of the major steps 
2 This is not what Hawking does, and the reason for it will become clear in the next section. He does not 
ignore philosophy, but engages with it.
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forward in mechanics during the [17th] century involved the contradiction of Descartes. 
Although the mechanical philosophy asserted that the particles of matter of which the uni-
verse is composed are governed in their motions by the laws of mechanics, the precise 
description of motions led repeatedly to conflict between the science of mechanics and the 
mechanical philosophy.” (Westfall 1971, p. 138). Again, one might take this as an instance 
where philosophy constrains scientific progress by its adherence to pre-conceived and non-
negotiable ontological ideas.
In a third, more recent example, Lawrence Krauss has argued that, when it comes to 
the most philosophical questions about for instance quantum mechanics, such as ‘what is 
a measurement?’, he finds the reflections of physicists more useful than those of philoso-
phers (Krauss 2012), again reflecting the agnostic stance that says: “Show me examples 
where philosophy has been useful for science, for I don’t know of any.”
The historical argument, then, generally amounts to the following: “Look at the rela-
tionship between science and philosophy in the past. Any attempts at close collaboration or 
integration between science and philosophy have always failed. It is useless to try.”
c) Division of property: method and subject matters
The third argument lies at the root of the other two. It says that philosophy and the natu-
ral sciences have different subject matters, therefore a small basis of overlap: they can live 
happily together without interfering with each other. This would explain the tendency of 
philosophers, signalled by Hawking, to retreat into the study of human affairs and human 
societies, leaving the study of nature to natural scientists.
The underlying reasoning can be understood as follows. The traditional distinction, at 
any rate since the nineteenth century, between the natural sciences and the humanities, is 
in their subject matters: nature would be the subject matter of the natural sciences, whereas 
humanities would busy themselves with the products of the human mind. The social sci-
ences would then focus on human behaviour and social realities. Science would only be 
interested in brute matters of fact and not in social or linguistic constructs, and it would 
know those matters of fact by means of experiments carried out under certain conditions 
and subject to requirements of transparency and replicability. Placing philosophy in the 
camp of the humanities and the social sciences as opposed to the natural sciences: it also 
would deal with products of the mind and social constructs. This would both institutional-
ise philosophy’s independence from science, as well as establish its uselessness for science.
To this difference in subject matters corresponds a difference in method, emphasized 
by Wilhelm Dilthey: erklären (to explain) would be the task of the natural sciences; the 
humanities would instead aim at verstehen (to understand, or comprehend): not to give a 
reductive account in terms of causal relation, but to create a comprehensive view where 
parts can be related to the whole. Science would aim at formulating general laws of nature 
via the universal language of mathematics; a universal language that, even if it would 
include probabilistic laws, would admit of no ambiguities; the goal of the scientist would 
then be: to explain the behaviour of nature in terms of laws that can be falsified or verified 
by experiments. It should be said that this methodological argument can be held quite inde-
pendently from differences in subject matters.
Philosophical interpretation of science would, according to some, either be mere specu-
lation, reflective of our lack of knowledge, or a matter of subjectivity and personal taste: 
therefore irrelevant for science. In a more permissive vein along the same line of reasoning, 
one might concede that there are interpretational issues and matters of debate in science, 
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but maintain that they only concern the human aspects of science, the use humans make of 
science: matters of ethics or subjective meaning of concepts; interpretations, being quite 
independent of the truth itself that science discovers, do not or should not have any sig-
nificant bearing on science. Debates would result from uncertainty and lack of knowledge, 
rather than being part of science.
3  Biting the Bullet? Characterising ‘Philosophy’
Maybe these criticisms are not so off the mark. Maybe we should as philosophers just bite 
the bullet, and accept that we have managed to make ourselves irrelevant by disengaging 
from the latest concerns of science (a)—perhaps because we are not interested in science 
(c), or because we are not good at it (b). Of course, this would be an oversimplification. 
For there are plenty of philosophers who are interested in science, as well as scientifically 
well-informed. But for the next two paragraphs, I wish to entertain the thesis that maybe 
those criticisms are right, before I say a bit more about how I will use the word ‘philoso-
phy’ in the rest of the paper. Scientists often lament that philosophers are ignorant of sci-
ence, that they do armchair science, that they never test their theoretical conjectures, that 
philosophers make empirical claims that are known to be false, etc. This may have been 
historically true of some philosophers like for example Hegel, and perhaps it would not be 
hard to find current books, written by philosophers, illustrating these shortcomings.3 So 
yes, maybe Hawking’s criticism—that one mischievous and catchy sentence, “philosophy 
is dead… Scientists have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for 
knowledge”—even if outrageously oversimplifying, does have bite.
But biting or not: it remains a false oversimplification. The rest of my essay will be 
concerned with how science needs philosophy. That should of course not make us forget 
the other fact—that philosophy needs science just as badly—but this essay will put that 
question aside.
At this point I should say a bit more about what I mean by ‘philosophy’. Defining phi-
losophy is not an easy task; and the nature of philosophy, or of the philosophical life, has 
been one of the traditional philosophical questions—it was in Athens, at any rate: but, for-
tunately, I will not be concerned with the nature of philosophy, as such, in this essay, but 
rather with parts of philosophy that are close to science.
I will be especially concerned with philosophy of science, more specifically with what 
one could call ‘the philosophy of X’, where X is a scientific discipline such as physics, 
chemistry or biology. General philosophy of science is of course particularly relevant for 
science, since it reflects on the nature and structure of scientific theories, and on the sci-
entific process itself. But my main argument will be about the sub-disciplines of philoso-
phy of science concerned with specific disciplines. In this way, philosophy of science ful-
fils various roles. It engages critically, at various levels, with the foundations, methods, 
and results of the sciences. Thus it not only makes explicit what is often only mentioned 
implicitly by scientific theories, but it also analyses the concepts and methods of scientific 
theories, and engages with the interpretation of their results. Furthermore, philosophy is, as 
3 I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting some of the above criticisms of current philosophy. For 
some examples, see Ladyman and Ross (2007: pp. 17–24).
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we will see in Sect. 4, sometimes used more constructively to develop new scientific theo-
ries—what I will call science’s ‘heuristic function’.
But saying that philosophy of science is relevant to science does not mean that the 
importance of philosophy is limited to philosophy of science. For philosophy of science 
itself builds on discussions in other parts of philosophy—not only the history of philoso-
phy, but also ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics, to name a few. Thus, although my 
main argument is geared towards the relevance of philosophy of science, one should not 
lose these broader aspects of philosophy of science of sight. Subdivisions within philoso-
phy are drawn for practical reasons, but when analysing specific problems they can also 
be artificial—as we will see in Sect. 4b), where philosophy of physics requires discussing 
questions that belong to epistemology and ontology. Thus metaphysics, once banned by the 
logical positivists in the heyday of their youthful excesses, now thrives happily in analytic 
philosophy in ways that would have made Carnap, and even Quine, frown. But never mind 
the old glories—philosophy will never obey all your commands and prohibitions, and it 
will use whatever tools it can get hold of.
4  Science Needs Philosophy
I now get back to the response to the anti-philosophy arguments given in Sect. 2. What can 
one answer to these arguments, which seem to echo our most endearing notions and intui-
tions about the nature of science? Can we really deny that science and philosophy are two 
different worlds; that their subject matters and methods differ? Can we deny that science 
seeks to explain brute matters that are quite independent of human life? Can we deny the 
fact that unquestioned philosophical preconceptions have at times been hampering factors 
of scientific progress? Of course, we can’t, as I hinted at in the previous Section: philoso-
phy corrupts the youth—I think we all need to start from that. But that’s only one side of 
the story, and not the most interesting part for us.
As I will argue, the doctrine that philosophy is useless for science is not only false: it is 
also harmful for education, society, and ultimately science itself. I will do this by advanc-
ing three arguments for the usefulness of philosophy for the natural sciences. These argu-
ments include refutations of the misconceptions presented in Sect.  2. They are neither 
wholly original nor exhaustive, but they should be a first step towards the development of a 
synergetic relationship between philosophy and the natural sciences.
Given the tensions between science and philosophy, vividly expressed by physicists 
such as Stephen Hawking and Lawrence Krauss in recent works, trying to gain some clar-
ity in this confused subject is by itself an important and urgent task.
a) Why philosophy is useful (Ad 2a))
i. The fallacy of anti-philosophicalism
Let me start with a simple contention that responds to a small, logical, part of the pre-
vious arguments: what I have called the fallacy of anti-philosophicalism and its refuta-
tion. The refuting argument boils down to something like this: “In order to argue that one 
does not need philosophy, one must do philosophy.” Indeed, a convincing argument to the 
effect that “philosophy is useless for science” will necessarily entail the act of philoso-
phizing. Even if ‘useful’ is a practical notion, arguing for the uselessness of discipline A 
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for discipline B requires philosophical knowledge about B: one needs to argue that A is 
irrelevant to the subject matter, method, and goals of B. To declare categorically the use-
lessness of philosophy for science is therefore to have complete knowledge of the goals, 
method, and subject matter of science. But one can only argue about what those goals and 
subject matter should be by doing philosophy—more specifically, philosophy of science. 
Furthermore, we can only infer general statements about the usefulness of philosophy for 
science, from the study of a limited number of historical cases, by appending that study 
with a philosophical argument: hence by doing philosophy, in the way that historians and 
philosophers of science do it.
Does this debunk the argument about the death of philosophy? I submit that it does. 
For he who wants to insist on philosophy being useless for science must not try to ration-
ally argue for this conviction, but must keep it as a matter of private opinion: for as soon 
as he starts to rationalize his view, he must start philosophizing. If there is some truth in 
that, as Hawking announces, philosophy is dead—and there may be some sense in which 
this is true—and that “Scientists have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our 
quest for knowledge”, then scientists can only do so by becoming philosophers of science 
themselves, hence resurrecting philosophy. Hawking acknowledges this by engaging in the 
discipline he has declared to be ‘dead’, thereby becoming a philosopher. Indeed, training in 
philosophy has at least this use, that it prevents us from being bad philosophers.
But, when arguing for the usefulness of philosophy, a logical argument is not necessar-
ily the most convincing one. For it might lead us to replace the fallacy by a more cautious 
statement: “philosophy is useless for science, except for one thing: to argue that philosophy 
has no other use for science whatever.” Nevertheless, the fact that the former statement 
was false and the latter sounds arbitrary and contrived, leads us to question the soundness 
of an approach that declares philosophy to be close to useless. It might lead us to the idea 
that perhaps there is some genuine value in philosophy which is useful or even necessary 
for science and for scientists after all. I will defend the view that philosophy is useful to 
scientists, and that some amount of philosophical activity is necessary in order to construct 
a theoretical framework for doing science.
 ii. Paradigms and presuppositions (why science can’t live without philosophy)
The necessity of philosophy for science can easily be understood from a Kuhnian per-
spective on how science develops. Thomas Kuhn explicates progress in science not as a 
linear process of theoretical formulation and experimental verification or refutation of 
scientific theories, but in terms of revolutions and changes of paradigm (Kuhn 1962). A 
paradigm is for Kuhn not a cookbook recipe about the mathematical laws and mechanical 
workings of the universe or a set of equations and technical terms and procedures. Par-
adigms include ways of looking at the world, practices of instrumentation, traditions of 
research, shared values and beliefs about which questions are considered to be scientific. 
Nowadays we might want to stretch this concept even further to include institutional con-
ditions, governmental constraints and market stimuli that may be supportive of particular 
paradigms.4 Scientists working in different paradigms view the world in different ways, 
Kuhn has emphasized. Their basic assumptions about the kinds of entities there are in the 
world differ, as do the kinds of primary properties they attribute to those entities. Scientists 
working in different paradigms may disagree, as did Einstein and Bohr, about what makes 
4 For the importance of tools and instrumentation, contexts, and power in different science cultures, see 
Galison and Stump (1996) and Galison (1997).
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a good theory or a good explanation; or about what it means to understand a problem. In 
other words, there are a wide range of ontological, epistemic, and ethical presuppositions 
weaved into any given scientific paradigm (for some examples of this, see Sect. 4b). If it is 
the case that a paradigm cannot come to birth, gain support, defeat its competitors, consoli-
date, and eventually die without such a set of explicit or at least tacit presuppositions, then 
presuppositions must be an intrinsic and necessary part of science regarded as a pursuit 
of truth. Such philosophical presuppositions are contributory to scientific theories, even if 
the theories are formally independent of them, because axioms cannot even be formulated 
without an agreement, taken from common and technical language, and justified within a 
wider paradigm, over what the terms mean and what kinds of entities they apply to; with-
out implicit or explicit assumptions about how the terms relate to experimentally meas-
urable quantities; without prescriptions for how the results of the theory can be verified 
or falsified. Paradigms also suggest meaningful goals and open questions for the theory. 
Thus philosophy plays a heuristic role in the discovery of new scientific theories (de Regt 
2004): paradigms can function as guides towards the formulation of theories that describe 
entities of one type or another. As de Regt has cogently argued (see also the examples in 
the next Section), many great scientific innovators have at some point studied the works of 
philosophers and developed philosophical views of their own. This did not always happen 
very systematically, but the interest in philosophy developed by these scientists was at least 
above average and in turn had an important heuristic function in the formulation of new 
scientific theories (de Regt 2004).
Implicit in the heuristic role of philosophy is also an important analytic function, as I 
stressed in Sect. 4.5 One task of philosophy is to scrutinize the concepts and presupposi-
tions of scientific theories, to analyse and lay bare what is implicit in a particular scien-
tific paradigm. It is a philosophical task—one which is often carried out by physicists—to 
clarify the concepts of space, time, matter, energy, information, causality, etc. that figure 
in a given theory. This analysis is philosophical in so far as it makes explicit the implicit 
assumptions in the uses of these concepts: assumptions that scientific theories do not them-
selves normally state. Hence it moves beyond the point where the concepts appear as irre-
ducible elements in the postulates of a theory. This analytic function should ultimately 
allow for a further step of integration, where the concepts of one science are related to the 
concepts of another.
The analytic function of philosophy might not only feed back into science, but become a 
starting point for philosophy itself: discovering what entities science assumes there to be in 
the world can be a useful starting point for philosophical reflection on nature. It seems key 
that philosophical stances on nature and science be compatible with the kinds of objects 
and relations that science finds. In the example given earlier: mechanistic philosophy did 
not admit the concept of action at a distance because the only forces allowed by the domi-
nant philosophical paradigm were mechanical, hence the opposition to Newton’s gravity 
theory; whereas Kepler’s Pythagoreanism did allow for such a concept.6
To summarize, then, some of the tasks for philosophy that we have found in relation to 
science:
5 This ‘analytic’ function of philosophy does not strictly correlate with analytic philosophy. Both the ana-
lytic and continental traditions have of course been concerned with analysis of science and of its results.
6 This holds true despite the fact that Kepler was one of the initiators of mechanistic science, and that also 
Newton in various ways held mechanical views. He regarded his theory of gravity as a phenomenological, 
inductively generalized law of nature that would nevertheless require further explanation as to its causes.
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1. To allow for, indeed to naturally incorporate into its own framework and build upon, the 
kinds of entities that science encounters in the world, and their properties and relations;7
2. To scrutinize the terms and presuppositions of science, i.e. to make explicit the implicit 
assumptions of scientific theories: to critically analyse and clarify what the terms used 
by science mean, how they are articulated, and what assumptions they require, as well 
as how they relate to the entities that philosophy argues there to be in the world;
3. To discover standards for what good theories, valid modes of explanation, and appropri-
ate scientific methods are: to offer an epistemology that does not thwart, but stimulates 
scientific progress;
4. To provide ethical guidance and discover (broad) goals for science;
5. To point out and articulate the interrelations between concepts that are found in different 
domains of the natural sciences as well as the social sciences and the humanities;
6. To explain how observations fit in the broader picture of the world, and to create a 
language where scientific results and broader human experience can complement and 
mutually enrich each other.
This list is neither exhaustive nor unique. Some of these general ideas will be instantiated 
in the two examples given in the next section.
The above points to a necessary relationship between science and philosophy. Science 
needs philosophy, as we have seen, in its two functions: heuristic, and analytic. Especially 
during changes of paradigm, philosophical debate will be part of the activities of science. 
None of this is to say that scientists need to be philosophers: most of them are not. So, phi-
losophers may be drawn in at that point. But it is also not to say that professional philoso-
phers should be doing all of the above tasks. Part of those tasks—surely 1 to 4—are often 
performed by scientists. Thus what I envisage here is a collaboration between scientists and 
philosophers. Indeed, I think we should be careful in distinguishing the disciplinary differ-
ences from the professional or individual ones. Saying that science, as a systematic theoret-
ical and experimental study of the natural world, needs philosophy—which I have defined, 
in the analytic tradition, as the study of all the results of the sciences and humanities using 
the method of conceptual analysis—is not to say that each scientist requires philosophy. 
Philosophy may be merely a useful tool for scientists.
b) Why the historical argument fails: quantum information, alive and kicking (Ad 2b))
In this section, I give two examples where philosophical discussion has been genu-
inely contributory to science, along the lines discussed in 4a)ii. Before I do that, I will 
address the negative examples given in 2b)—examples where philosophy’s influence was 
rather hampering: the iron clad of mechanistic philosophy and Plato’s dictum that celestial 
motions should be along circles.
Working from 4a)ii we can now easily see that these examples in fact become a case in 
point: they illustrate the importance of philosophy for science. They make clear the need 
for having the right philosophical framework when doing science. If a conceptual enter-
prise such as philosophy were completely neutral, or indeed useless, to science, it could 
7 See for examples the debates about the status of the wave-function in quantum mechanics: it is an impor-
tant question whether the wave-function is a real entity existing in the world, or whether it merely repre-
sents the information about a system. This is a question that the formalism by itself does not answer, but 
nevertheless is important for how quantum mechanics is interpreted and used.
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not be harmful to it in any important way either. But the fact is that: (A) some philosophi-
cal doctrines have been harmful for science while others have been productive; (B) it is 
impossible to have no philosophy at all (as I argued in 4a)); (C) the reason philosophy was 
harmful in some cases is because it was used in a positive way, according to its heuristic 
function from 4a)ii. And this heuristic function can indeed also be used positively. The 
correct course of action, then, is not to neglect philosophy—because, as per (A) and (B), 
philosophy can’t be neglected—but to embrace its presence and to use it in an intelligent 
and positive way, as in (C). It follows from (A) to (C) that philosophy must be relevant to 
science in its own specific way, even if it is only in the manner of setting necessary intellec-
tual preconditions of freedom of mind, of trust in the power of reason and of experimental 
observation, etc. History shows that it is hard for scientists to free themselves from out-
dated philosophical modes of thought. This highlights the importance of investing in hav-
ing a philosophical framework that allows for the kinds of entities that science encounters 
in the world. Specific tasks for philosophy are as listed in 4a)ii.
Next we will study positive historical examples where 4a)ii is at work, thereby refut-
ing the historical argument formulated in 2b). To refute the historical argument, it suffices 
to show one example where philosophy has been genuinely contributory to the progress 
of science. The example will be interesting in so far as it also sheds light on why it was 
that philosophy contributed to science, thus instantiating elements of 4a)ii. There are many 
such examples. Kepler8 and Sommerfeld were both inspired by Pythagorean philosophi-
cal ideas when working out their models of the harmonies of the solar system and of the 
atom, respectively. Let me here concentrate on another, more recent, example. It concerns 
the current revolution in quantum information technology. In the past ten years we have 
seen the first commercialization of quantum randomness: the first bank transaction built on 
the basis of a code encrypted not by the usual algorithms of classical cryptography (which 
rely on unproven mathematical assumptions such as the difficulty in factorizing large prime 
numbers), but based on the new field of quantum cryptography: a technique for encoding 
messages based on the notion of entanglement between particles at long distances. Quan-
tum cryptography has been successfully developed and commercialized by several groups 
over the past twenty years or so.
As it turns out, the quantum information revolution is rooted in the efforts of scientists 
who saw philosophical enquiry as a necessary step in their quest for knowledge. There are 
two key moments in the history of quantum mechanics when physical progress crucially 
depended on asking the right philosophical questions. Let me take these two episodes as 
case studies of the question how philosophical ideas influence science, in terms of philoso-
phy’s heuristic and analytic functions.
i. Einstein versus quantum mechanics
In 1927, conflicting views on quantum physics started to crystallize. Towards the end 
of the 5th Solvay conference in Brussels, Werner Heisenberg declared quantum mechan-
ics to be a “closed theory, whose fundamental physical and mathematical assumptions are 
no longer susceptible of any modification” (Bacciagaluppi and Valentini 2006, p. 437). In 
doing so, Heisenberg was voicing the shared feelings of his colleagues Niels Bohr, Wolf-
gang Pauli, and Paul Dirac, also present at the conference. But Einstein and Schrödinger 
would have none of it: the Copenhagen interpretation—as the new view of quantum 
8 For a visualisation of Kepler’s model of the universe, see Katherine Brading’s Digital Visualization Pro-
ject: https ://kathe rineb radin g.wordp ress.com/news/digit al-visua lizat ion-proje ct.
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mechanics came to be known—had philosophical implications that they deemed undesira-
ble. Among those properties was the lack of determinacy in physical quantities and events. 
Also, Heisenberg and co. seemed to introduce a possible role for human observers in the 
definition of the concepts that went into science.
A few years later, in 1935, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen made the nature of their dis-
comfort with quantum theory explicit in a famous article that came to be known as the 
EPR thought experiment. They considered pairs of correlated particles separated at long 
distances. The possibility to measure a property (for example, the momentum) of the first 
particle automatically gives information about the value of that property for the second 
particle, without measuring that property for the second particle, since the particles are 
in a state of correlation. And the possibility to measure the complementary property (for 
example, the position) of the first particle would as well determine the value of that quan-
tity for the second particle. But because of the assumption that measurements done on the 
first particle cannot affect the properties of the second particle (after all, the particles are 
well-separated), the second particle must have had the values of its position and momen-
tum determined before any measurements were done on the first particle (since, according 
to the formalism of quantum mechanics, a measurement of the first particle determines the 
value of that property for the other particle, in both cases). Since, according to standard 
quantum mechanics, a particle cannot simultaneously have determinate values for both its 
position and its momentum, this means that quantum mechanics is an incomplete theory: 
for it does not predict properties for the second particle that, according to the argument, it 
can clearly have.
The EPR argument is philosophical in the sense explained earlier, in Sect.  3: for it 
analyses the foundations of quantum mechanics, trying to think clearly about the assump-
tions being made by standard quantum mechanics. But it also contains two substantive 
ontological assumptions. The first is what EPR call the ‘criterion of reality’ that if, using 
the formalism of quantum mechanics, one can predict with probability one the result of a 
measurement, then there is an element of physical reality corresponding to the physical 
quantity, with value equal to the predicted value of the measurement. The second assump-
tion is what they call ‘locality’: namely, that elements of physical reality pertaining to one 
system cannot be affected by measurements performed on another system that is spacelike 
separated from the first.
Thus EPR’s quest was both physical and philosophical. In addition to these two onto-
logical assumptions, they also impose ‘completeness’ as an epistemic desideratum that a 
theory should satisfy: namely, that ‘every element of the physical reality must have a coun-
terpart in the physical theory’.
This led EPR to push the physical arguments farther than anybody had ever done before. 
The study of paradoxes borne out by thought experiments such as EPR has always played 
a major role in physics; but the resolution of such paradoxical situations almost invari-
ably requires a philosophical stance about the principles and methods that are valued and 
deemed legitimate.
The EPR paper was truly philosophical in so far at it analysed and questioned the con-
ceptual foundations of quantum theory. Especially EPR’s construal of the notion of com-
pleteness, and their criterion of reality, are explicit epistemic and ontological positions.
Does this mean that Einstein was being professional philosophers while he worked on 
that paper? Of course not. One should distinguish doing philosophy—something that, like 
I said before, can be done by both physicists and philosophers—from one’s professional 
label. Einstein was doing the philosophy that physics required at that point in time—and 
it was philosophy because he was reflecting on, and critically and constructively engaging 
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with, the conceptual foundations of quantum theory. To do that, he needed philosophical 
tools. But he was of course also doing physics. So, by bringing philosophical methods into 
physics, he was advancing physics. I believe it is artificial, at such interdisciplinary inter-
sections, to attempt to make too fixed a demarcation between physics and philosophy. Ein-
stein was simply doing ground-breaking work that required methods from both fields.
 ii. Physics and the hippies
The next episode in this story of physics and philosophy took place many years later. 
After the publication of EPR, physicists continued to philosophize about the interpretation 
of quantum mechanics, but eventually the discussion died out. During the cold war, sci-
ence and in particular physics gained much prestige. As class sizes grew, increasingly less 
time was spent on big questions and philosophical debates in the classrooms. While part 
of the reason for this decrease of attention on philosophical issues may have been prag-
matic—philosophical discussions with large groups of students are hard to manage, and 
grading essay questions in exams is significantly more time consuming than computational 
questions—a vision was certainly at play about what education in science and technol-
ogy should prepare students for. The interpretation of quantum mechanics was unlikely 
to prepare students who could provide societies with new gadgets or governments with 
new powerful weapons, whereas technical mastery of the formulas actually might. The 
old generation of physicists had received thorough training in the humanities—Werner 
Heisenberg once said “My mind was formed by studying philosophy, Plato and that sort of 
thing” (Buckley and Peat 1996, p. 6) and they had indulged in philosophical musings about 
the meaning of it all. Now the new generation of strong-headed physicists uttered the war 
whoop “Shut up and calculate” and instructed their students to rally behind their utilitarian 
flag. Making gadgets was the new goal of physics.
The instrumentalist view of science regnant during the decades after the war is 
explained by Lee Smolin as follows: “When I learned physics in the 1970s, it was almost 
as if we were being taught to look down on people who thought about foundational prob-
lems. When we asked about the foundational issues in quantum theory, we were told that 
no one fully understood them but that concern with them was no longer part of science. 
The job was to take quantum mechanics as given and apply it to new problems. The spirit 
was pragmatic; “Shut up and calculate” was the mantra. People who couldn’t let go of their 
misgivings over the meaning of quantum theory were regarded as losers who couldn’t do 
the work.” (Smolin 2007, p. 312).
But instrumentalism had to give way to other kinds of motivation for doing physics. 
Economic recession, budget cuts, and the decrease in the number of physics jobs made 
class sizes decrease again. Physicists once again had the time to think about the meaning 
of what they were doing. In a second, seemingly unrelated line of developments, the CIA, 
afraid that Americans would lag behind the Soviets, decided to fund laser physicist Harald 
Puthoff at Stanford University’s SRI lab in Menlo Park, California, for the study of psychic 
phenomena. Additional money came from NASA. Soon Puthoff would be associated with a 
third strand of events around the Bay Area. A dubious consortium of hippie physicists and 
quasi-crackpots formed an unlikely discussion group. They alternated their musings about 
all things quantum and the meaning of life with drinking parties and psychedelic drug use. 
They came to be known as the Fundamental Fysiks Group and eventually found a generous 
patron in self-help industry forerunner and multi-millionaire guru Werner Erhard. One goal 
of the hippie scientists was to use quantum mechanics for superluminal (faster-than-light) 
communication. This would include communication with their deceased colleagues. Need-
less to say, many of their arguments were misguided, but their contribution to physics was 
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of lasting endurance. They not only put the interpretation of quantum mechanics on the 
research and teaching agenda; they analysed the EPR arguments and the important contri-
butions to this discussion made by John Bell, David Bohm, and others, which had escaped 
the attention of scientists until then; they helped clarify the issues at stake, developed new 
thought experiments of their own, and raised awareness that quantum nonlocality might be 
useful in long-distance communication. Save the crucial (wrong) conclusion that superlu-
minal communication was possible, several set-ups and techniques the hippies considered 
did not differ significantly from the ones that quantum communication uses nowadays. As 
David Kaiser has argued (Kaiser 2012, p. xxiii), “The group’s efforts helped to bring sus-
tained attention to the interpretation of quantum mechanics back into the classroom. And in 
a few critical instances, their work instigated major breakthroughs that—with hindsight—
we may now recognize as laying crucial groundwork for quantum information science.”
Like Einstein, the Fundamental Fysiks Group worked at the intersection of physics 
and philosophy. They brought philosophical methods and literature to bear on problems 
in physics, and as such they did the kind of work that I argue physics periodically needs—
regardless of who does that work, whether it is the physicists themselves or the profes-
sional philosophers.
The two examples illustrate some of the tasks of philosophy for science listed in 
Sect. 4a)ii. Progress in fundamental issues such as entanglement and quantum communi-
cation stemmed from physicists’ willingness to engage in debates about ontological and 
epistemic issues such as the role of the observer, the completeness of the mathematical 
description of nature, the desiderata for a good description of nature, and so on. Progress 
not driven by such philosophical questions is hard to imagine in this case; the philosophical 
debate that actually took place acted as a positive, guiding force that pushed science fur-
ther; fuelled by the posing of legitimate and relevant philosophical questions in their quest 
for new physics, by their being insistent on philosophical clarity and coherence rather than 
content with just technical mastery of the formulas, which was the trend of the day.
c) Synergy between science and philosophy (on objects and methods) (Ad 2c))
There are two sides to the objection regarding the difference between science and phi-
losophy as forms of scholarship: subject matters on the one hand, methodology on the 
other.
I will be brief about the distinction in subject matter. Philosophy studies every subject 
matter that the sciences also study (recall my ‘philosophy of X’ from Sect. 3), but it does 
this with different aims and methods. The universe, possible universes other than our own, 
elementary particles, life, are all subjects of concern for both natural science and philoso-
phy. Therefore, on those overlaps science and philosophy cannot be distinguished on the 
basis of their subject matters alone. The difference is often sought in their formal objects 
and methodologies: the earlier mentioned distinction between erklären and verstehen could 
be reframed as the statement that the natural sciences seek explanations in the modes of 
causal efficacy and material causation, whereas philosophy is interested in formal analy-
sis, goals, and intentionality. This difference in methodology is often summed up by the 
mantra: ‘philosophy asks why-questions, science asks how-questions’. And I agree: their 
methods are different, and their aims (in particular, the specific interest from which they 
study ‘the same subject matter’) are also different. But I also submit that any such division 
cannot be made once and for all—the division is both vague at any point in time, as well as 
dynamical.
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By declaring that there is such a division of intellectual activities, natural scientists 
and philosophers can comfortably go about their work without competing or stepping on 
each other’s shoes. But, as I am suggesting, the mantra is as comfortable as it is lacking 
in accuracy in fully reflecting the nature of the relationship between science and philoso-
phy. Agreed: science and philosophy are in principle different forms of scholarship. For 
established fields of science such as classical mechanics or electromagnetism, there may be 
much truth in the statement that science is practically interested in how-questions, defined 
by the framework of the particular paradigm one is working in. But that is so only because 
a number of why-questions have been answered within the wider paradigm and are not 
being questioned any further. When paradigms are in the making, there is no clear-cut dis-
tinction between the scholar asking the how-questions and the scholar asking the why-ques-
tions. Any how-question may lead us to a why-question, and any answer to a why-question 
may lead us to answers to multiple how-questions. When placed in front of a why-question 
in the quest for a new theory, the scientist cannot retreat into the shell of specialism. He or 
she must struggle with the question using whichever intellectual means are available. He 
or she may need to establish, as the founding fathers of quantum mechanics attempted to 
do, what a measurement is before they can convincingly argue that there is such a thing as 
uncertainty in the microscopic world. The scientific quest presupposes having a number of 
philosophical issues settled first: or, at least, it presupposes engaging with the various con-
ceptual options, and taking a stance on them. In so doing, the subject matters and methods 
of philosophers and of scientists become entangled: the relationship between science and 
philosophy becomes dynamical.
This is particularly true in our time, when science has expanded into realms—from 
far-away galaxies to the multiverse to neuroscience to molecular engineering—that were 
unknown territory just a number of decades before. Science is aimed at truth about the 
natural world, and although methodological distinctions can be made formally, one must be 
aware of their limitations: in particular, it would be wrong to conclude that a methodologi-
cal distinction allows us to dismiss philosophy for the sake of science.
This brings us to another point: if science needs philosophy, scientific results should 
also be the starting point of philosophical reflection about nature. It is probably here that 
Hawking’s criticism of philosophy has an important core of truth to it (see footnote 1).
There is another reason why science needs philosophy. Scientific knowledge is not 
technical specialism cut off from the rest of human knowledge. The moment this happens 
would signal the forthcoming death of science. Scientific results constitute knowledge to 
be integrated into the broader human quest for answers about ourselves and about the uni-
verse. Philosophy helps the scientist articulate her findings in a kind of knowledge that can 
be shared with others, not experts in her field; it will help her discuss with other intellectu-
als and contribute to the general human task of getting to know the world and ourselves 
better.
To summarize my main argument so far: the relationship between science and philos-
ophy may be in bad shape, and philosophy may be in bad shape, but it cannot be dead 
as long as we are trying to understand the universe around us. Historically, philosophy 
has been very influential for science, as has science been for philosophy. Any instances 
where philosophy had a negative effect on science in fact contribute to highlighting the 
importance of thinking carefully about the relation between philosophy and science. Sci-
ence cannot do without philosophy because there are philosophical stances implicit in the 
presuppositions and goals of any scientific paradigm and in how theories are connected to 
reality: and it is the task of philosophy of science to critically engage with those presup-
positions. Thus science needs philosophy to scrutinize those presuppositions, stances, and 
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goals. And philosophical tools are sometimes required to make progress—as the EPR and 
quantum information revolution illustrate. Finally, science requires philosophy to connect 
its findings to the rest of human knowledge. Philosophy can act as a language connecting 
disciplines that are far away from each other.
Since the subject matters of science and of philosophy are partially overlapping, formal 
or methodological distinctions between science and philosophy only have limited ranges 
of applicability and certainly do not imply independence of the two disciplines. In other 
words, the boundaries between science and philosophy are not water-tight, nor should they 
be.
5  Liberal Arts and Sciences: Freeing the Mind
Having argued, at the end of the previous section, that science as such needs philosophy, 
I will now look at the implications of this statement for education. That is, I would like to 
add a few reflections about how scientists need philosophy, and how this is to be reflected 
in education.
Let me start by examining what does and does not follow from what we have estab-
lished so far. From the assertion that science needs philosophy in some way it does not 
follow that each individual scientist should be a skilled philosopher, or in fact should have 
any kind of developed skill in philosophy. A scientist faced with a philosophical question 
in the course of her research might choose to neglect it and still do a relatively good job 
at her research, at least for some time. Also, despite the fact that every scientist has a phi-
losophy that is at least weaved into the presuppositions and goals of the given theory or 
paradigm that the scientist works in, perhaps appended with her own private reflections, 
it is true that science can be done for the sake of science with neglect of the philosophi-
cal presuppositions and for exclusively utilitarian goals. Obviously, utilitarian values do 
not offer a sustainable basis for science as a whole and for maintaining public trust in the 
meaningfulness of fundamental research. But for the individual scientist, they might just 
suffice. Furthermore, even in the case that the scientist has her own philosophical views, 
she is free to keep them private and not let them interfere with the research she is doing. 
In fact, scientists may work together on the same scientific problem while sustaining dif-
ferent ontological or epistemic presuppositions. Philosophy may be even less relevant for 
the applied scientist (although, especially for her, ethical issues will be important!). So, for 
all practical purposes, the individual scientist might get away with neglecting philosophy. 
What use, one might cynically enquire, will the laser physicist have in formal training in 
philosophy? Even taking the point that every scientist in fact makes use of philosophical 
thought of one kind or another—a set of ideas about the scientific practice, about the nature 
of the objects and relations that constitute her subject matter, etc.—one may still argue that 
it is enough for the individual scientist to work within the philosophical framework of a 
specific paradigm; to employ, in her daily work as a scientist, the intuitions that she inter-
nalized in the context of the specific paradigm or tradition in which she was trained. There 
is no need for receiving specific training in philosophical matters. Thus philosophy courses 
of the kind I have in mind cannot be seen as necessary prerequisites for any single scientist. 
But I argue that they are useful for them, and that scientists would benefit from them: and 
so, that science programmes ought to have such courses—again, without going into details, 
which would require a separate paper.
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So, this suggests the following question. Shouldn’t the education of future scientists 
somehow reflect the connection that we have found between the sciences and philoso-
phy? Indeed, particularly in the context of liberal arts and sciences, it is key that educa-
tion reflects that connection. Science students in modern liberal arts and sciences programs 
should receive training in philosophy specific to their particular sciences. The kind of train-
ing I am arguing for here goes beyond general courses such as logic and philosophy of 
science, which are very important and are already part of some liberal arts and sciences 
curricula, as electives at least. It also goes beyond ethics, which is obviously an important 
training for scientists—although here one should go beyond the theoretical cocktail-party 
way in which some of these courses are taught, since their relevance often escapes the 
student. Perhaps such courses should be based more on actual scientific episodes and prac-
tices. But ethics is in itself a very large subject, and I have something else in mind here that 
more directly relates to my case studies: namely, philosophical reflection specific to each 
of the sciences, in fact specific to each particular science course a student takes. I mean 
courses such as ‘The Philosophy of X’, where X is a discipline or a collection of related 
disciplines (see the discussion in Sect.  3). And I would argue that such materials could 
also be part of every science course, rather than separate courses, and so are best taught by 
scientists. If one is intrepid, one might wish to add a course on theory construction: but I 
admit, this will not be easy, though it could be very beneficial at the graduate level.
Historically, it has been a goal of liberal arts and sciences education to educate the 
social, political, and intellectual elites. In our century, the liberal arts and sciences are often 
advertised in somewhat different, but related terms: ‘training the leaders of the future who 
can solve global problems’ is something one often hears as part of the institutional rheto-
ric about liberal arts and sciences. Selective admission procedures, small class settings, 
and emphasis on basic logical, argumentative, and rhetorical skills do confirm this vision. 
Clearly, some of these leaders will also be leaders in their respective scientific fields, 
whether in applied or in fundamental science. So, if the liberal arts and sciences aim at 
training the intellectual elites of the future, in particular they should be interested in the 
scientists who can really make a difference in research and scientists who will be the lead-
ers of other scientists. More precisely; I will take a useful practical distinction made by 
Lee Smolin, even if I don’t agree with the broad-brush way Smolin applies it to string 
theory, nor with the details of his comparison with Kuhn’s idea of revolutionary science. 
The distinction goes back to Einstein, who wrote in a letter (letter to Robert A. Thornton 7 
December 1944, EA pp. 61-574): “I fully agree with you about the significance and educa-
tional value of methodology as well as history and philosophy of science. So many people 
today—and even professional scientists—seem to me like someone who has seen thou-
sands of trees but has never seen a forest. A knowledge of the historical and philosophical 
background gives that kind of independence from prejudices of his generation from which 
most scientists are suffering. This independence created by philosophical insight is—in my 
opinion—the mark of distinction between a mere artisan or specialist and a real seeker 
after truth.”9 In this rich quotation, Einstein argues, as he did in many other occasions, 
for the significance of training in the history and philosophy of science, which gives the 
scientist independence of thought, which is precisely the kind of liberation of the mind 
that liberal arts programs also seek. Second, he calls this freedom of mind the mark of 
distinction between a mere specialist and a real seeker after truth. Smolin explicates this 
9 Quoted by Smolin (2007), pp. 310–311.
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as follows. He divides scientists into seers and scientists who are master craftspeople. The 
seers are the ones leading the way, the ones who can see the whole forest, in Einstein’s 
words ‘the seekers after truth’. The master craftspeople are the ones who are very good 
at their particular trade, but have never seen a forest—be out of lack of interest or lack 
of sight. Smolin relates these two categories of scientists to the two types of science in 
Kuhn—normal science and revolutionary science.10 In normal science, all the details of 
a given paradigm are explored and worked out. This is mainly the master craftspeople’s 
work. They explore the mine, excavate the tunnels, take out the valuable jewels in a mine 
that was found and planned by others. Revolutionary science, on the other hand, is the 
task of going into new territory, of doing the exploratory work required to establish radical 
new ideas; that is the work of the seers, the people who can think out of the existing para-
digm—although never entirely—who can point out weaknesses in theories and propose 
new ways forward. Freedom of mind, among other things, is one of the characteristics of 
such scientists, and knowledge of history and philosophy contribute to that free way of 
thinking. If liberal arts and sciences programs advertise themselves as forming the lead-
ers of the future, shouldn’t they be seeking to form master craftspeople as well as seek-
ers, searchers of truth? Shouldn’t they be the breeding ground for scientists with a certain 
capacity of independence from prejudice and from the opinion of the majority as well as 
the ability to persuade others to pursue their radical ideals?
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